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The use of domestic service robots is becoming widespread. While in industrial settings robots
are often used for specified tasks, the challenge in the case of robots put to domestic use is to
afford human-robot collaboration in a variety of non-predefined and different daily tasks. Herein,
we aim at identifying and understanding the conditions that will facilitate flexible collaboration
between humans and robots. Past research of social and personality psychology was mainly focused
on individual’s self-regulation, defined as the ability to govern, or direct attention, resources, or
action toward the realization of a particular goal (Higgins, 1989; Kruglanski et al., 2002). There
is evidence that pursuing goals with the presence of others influences self-control (Fishbach and
Trope, 2005), however only little is known on dyadic processes of self-regulation. Additionally,
whereas research of goal pursuit in social psychology has mainly been associated with general
processes of the structure and function of goals (Gollwitzer and Bargh, 1996; Carver and Scheier,
1998; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Fishbach and Ferguson, 2007; Custers and Aarts, 2010), human-robot
interaction involves pragmatic interpersonal dilemmas such as how to coordinate human-robot
activity and what knowledge should be shared between humans and robots over the course of
action. To fill this gap, in what follows, we will define the unique characteristics of what we term
as human-robot coupled self-regulation, which has the unique features of a dyadic asymmetric team
aimed to increase the affordances of an individual in different activities.We will describe the unique
characteristics of human-robot interaction and its special challenges toward goal pursuit.
Human and Robot are a Dyadic Instrumental Asymmetric Team
Our first assumption is that self-regulation of a human-robot couple could be conceptualized
as a unique team configuration. A team is “a distinguishable set of two or more people
who interact, dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued
goal/objective/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and
who have a limited life-span of membership” (Salas et al., 1992, p. 4; Salas et al., 2010). Team
members have differentiated responsibilities and roles (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Therefore,
essential for a team’s successful performance is the understanding of the abilities and behaviors of
its members that fit their experience and unique expertise for the task at hand.
Because humans and robots differ in their level of agency (the capacity to act and do) and their
level of experience (the capacity to feel and sense), (Gray and Wegner, 2012), we argue that their
contribution to the team is not symmetric. Based on the reasoning that genuine authorship of
an action or situation may not always be clear (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008), we suggest that defined
requirements of person, robot, and situation are essential to reduce the expectation gap.
Our perspective is that human-robot collaboration should be viewed in terms of functionality, to
extend possibilities for the kinds of goals that humans want to pursue. These instrumental relations
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between a person and her tool, used to increase the fit between
person and environment, are termed affordances (Gibson,
1979). Following this view, we argue that robots can be
perceived as self-regulatory tools to increase affordances across
different situations (Koole andVeenstra, 2015). Our instrumental
relational approach enables flexibility in tuning the robot’s level of
responsiveness and dominance in human-robot social contexts.
For example, whereas the human member of the team holds
a fixed ownership position, the robot’s level of dominance
could vary by user demands, or depending on the situation.
To understand the usefulness of this principle, let us take for
example 80 year old Mrs. Brown. She is physically fragile, but
it is important for her to maintain an independent life style.
This is why she has “Rupert,” a multi-functional platform robot
that serves as her aid. When she leaves the house she may want
“Rupert” to lead and find the safest walking path to the store,
thus she may set it to high dominance and responsiveness, in case
she startles. At home, she may not desire high level of proactive
care-taking and leave “Rupert” to be on call.
Concrete Level of Human-robot
Negotiation
Our second assumption is that human-robot coupled self-
regulation is based on concrete rather than abstract level of
agreement. Carrying out human-robot joint actions demands
continuous coordination on at least five elements: (1) who takes
part; (2) what is the role of each member; (3) what is the joint
goal; (4) how does each team member contribute to the timing
and synchronization; and (5) where the actions take place (Clark,
2005). To address this, the robot should identify where the focus
of attention of the human is, to what degree the attention of the
human is focused on team actions, and how to convey feedback.
Similarly, the human needs to calibrate expectations from the
robot, i.e., be invested in the robot’s immediate action or approval
of action, and how to respond to the robot’s requests (Alami et al.,
2005).
Coupled self-regulation of goals requires agreement on goal
setting and goal striving as two basic phases in goal pursuit
(Gollwitzer and Oettingen, 2011). Whereas, robots may act
automatically from initiation to completion of the task, humans’
possible reflection on their performance may involve conscious
awareness and create new representations of behavior, thus
leading to communication gaps (Baumeister and Bargh, 2014).
According to the action identification theory, a specific action
can be verbally identified and interpreted from different levels of
abstraction, ranging from low-level identities that specify how the
action is performed, to high-level identities that signify why the
action is performed. For instance, a person who “drinks water”
can identify it as “holding a glass” (low level), or as “relieving
thirst” (high level) (Vallacher and Wegner, 1987, 1989). This
helps explain why different action identifications by human and
robot may lead to dissimilar systems of goals and means of
attainment (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah et al., 2002).
To address these challenges, we suggest the use of multiple
human-robot forms of communication to pursue the joint
goal. Lohan et al. (2014) proposed a distinction between two
kinds of actions: path-oriented and manner-oriented, that can
be communicated via two different linguistic utterance styles.
Whereas, in path-oriented utterances the goal is stressed,
in manner-oriented utterances, the means of motion are
emphasized (e.g., Talmy, 1991). In our example, Mrs. Brown
and “Rupert” carry a recliner to the porch (Path-“let’s move the
chair to the porch” or Manner-“I want to read my book on the
porch”). Suddenly the phone rings and Mrs. Brown wants to go
and answer ((Path-“let me go get the phone” or Manner-“I need
to answer this call”). “Rupert” must understand that the goal has
changed and pause.
Continuous and Various Communication
Forms Over Goal Pursuit
Research indicates that professional and social interactions
between team members can develop the team’s social cognition
(Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994). There is evidence that a
team’s fluent on-going communication regarding goal pursuit
reduces the need for preexisting knowledge (Kozlowski and Bell,
2003). In social HRI, it is critical to generate many levels of
interaction with the automation. Hence, the robot should always
be present and aim to facilitate the goal, even if only to provide
recommendations. In civil aviation, for example, communication
is key especially if things turn out unexpectedly. In the Northwest
2009 incident in Minneapolis the automation had the capability,
but was not designed to point out that the task was not performed
as planned and that the pilotsmissed their destination. To borrow
from our previous example, let us suppose Mrs. Brown wants
to grab a pillow from the upper cabinet. The robot may not be
able to reach so high, but it should continue to collaborate by
providing feedback and advice; I cannot reach the uppermost
cupboard (failure to complete task) but it is too dangerous for
you to try to reach it on your own, if not urgent, perhaps we
should call your son, or is there another pillow on a lower
shelf?
Much of human communication over goal pursuit is based
on social cues (e.g., gestures, and mimicry) that automatically
generate social judgment and behavior (Chartrand and Bargh,
1999; van Baaren et al., 2003; Leander et al., 2010). Similarly,
translation of social cues to social signals leads to inference
of human intentions by robotic agents (Fiore et al., 2013).
The relevance of automatic embodied cues for joint goal
pursuit was demonstrated in human-human and human-
robot synchronicity, suggesting that physical synchronicity is
associated with experience of responsiveness and empathy
(Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009; Cohen et al., 2010; Paladino et al.,
2010; Boucher et al., 2012; Hoffman et al., 2014). Embodied
communication is not only “used” by robots, but integrated in
them to support both the recognition of the human’s behavior
and the generation of their behavior. Research of social signal
processing and modeling multimodal communication, suggests
that social and behavioral cues may be detectable from amachine,
hence perceivable. Likewise, models of behavior are integrated in
a way that a robot exhibits a more natural behavior, aiming at
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a more successful interaction with the human (Pentland, 2007;
Vinciarelli et al., 2012).
However, despite emerging findings from the field of
embodied cognition on the potential of physical and social cues
as an alternative route for communication, it was also claimed
that embodied cognition cues can lead to different patterns of
activation across different contexts (Loersch and Payne, 2011),
thus prediction of behavior may be difficult (Shalev, 2015). A
possible way to address this limitation is to use robots in fixed
context, where interpretation to human’s embodied signals is less
ambiguous. For example Loth et al. (2013), have demonstrated
that bar staff responded to a set of two non-verbal signals. Foster
(2014), indicated that robotic sensors can similarly detect and
respond to these signals.
Addressing the Human-robot
Communication Gap over Goal Pursuit
Individuals frequently use embodied cues for functional self-
regulatory purposes (Balcetis and Cole, 2009; Schnall et al.,
2010; Bargh and Shalev, 2012; Shalev, 2014). However, using
embodied cues as diagnostic inputs (Williams et al., 2009;
Ackerman et al., 2010; Meier et al., 2012; Robinson and
Fetterman, 2015; Winkielman et al., 2015) may lead to human-
robot miscommunications. For example, human speakers expect
co-located listeners to link visually perceivable objects and the
verbally described references to them. Thus, humans may expect
a co-located robot to have the same visual-verbal linking abilities
(e.g., look at the green object on the right), thus developers
must integrate the robot’s visual system with natural language
components to enable this flow of communication (Kopp, 2010;
Cantrell et al., 2012; Vollmer et al., 2013).
Furthermore, there is also anecdotal evidence of human-
human communication misunderstandings in complex scenes.
For example orientation can be relative to egocentric, or
exocentric (absolute or relative) locations. Soldiers for example,
are taught to communicate via the exocentric coordinates of the
compass rose. However, most humans tend to naturally orient
relative to their egocentric perspective, which may be difficult
for robots to depict. Interestingly, Cassenti et al. (2012) found
that instructors used exocentric references to direct the robot and
that it improved their performance relative to egocentric-only
commands.
To address this communication gap, we argue that shared
database, sensors and multiple types of displays and interaction
means (e.g., physiological measures, eye tracking, voice, touch,
text, button presses etc.) can enrich the robot’s capacity of
perception and expression. Similarly, to reduce expectation
issues, technology can shape the way the user acts on the robot,
how individuals understand what to expect from it, and how they
can interact with a robot to refine their mutual understanding of
the task at hand. Providing the relevant information about the
current state of the robot, the progress of the task, and of the
surrounding environment, can facilitate successful performance.
Similarly, education efforts need to convey the ambiguity of
ongoing human-robot communication, particularly the robot’s
physical and data-driven limitations, and to encourage problem
solving and novelty seeking.
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